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ABSTRACT: Determining what content is expressed by a demonstrative when its reference cannot 
be determined is a problem for those who assume that demonstrative reference is cognized by 
interpreters and demonstrative meaning has a mere indicative role. Here, I explore a concept of 
content that gives meaning a cognitively relevant role, namely, John Perry’s classificatory concept 
of content. With that purpose, I compare the interpretation of a deictic demonstrative in two cases: 
for an eavesdropper and a conversational participant, aiming to show that meaning, in the form of 
reflexive rules, can be recruited to play the role of content when information (in the speech 
situation) is scarce. 
KEYWORDS: Demonstratives. Content. Conversation. Information. Reflexive rules. 
RESUMO: Determinar que conteúdo é expresso por um demonstrativo quando sua referência não 
pode ser determinada é um problema para aqueles que supõem que seu significado tem um papel 
meramente indicativo. Aqui, eu exploro um conceito de conteúdo que dá ao significado um papel 
cognitivamente relevante, a saber, o conceito de conteúdo classificatório de John Perry. Com tal 
propósito, eu comparo a interpretação de um demonstrativo dêitico em dois casos: para um 
interceptador (eavesdropper) e um participante conversacional, objetivando mostrar que o 
significado, na forma de regras reflexivas, pode ser recrutado para desempenhar o papel de 
conteúdo sempre que a informação (na situação de fala) for escassa. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Demonstrativos. Conteúdo. Conversação. Informação. Regras Reflexivas.  
 
 
Paradigmatic utterance situations are characterized by the fact that 
interpreters in them can successfully determine the reference of singular terms. In 
such cases, speakers and their interlocutors collaborate in joint communicative 
efforts to share information about individuals. For example, if two agents who are 
speakers of the same natural language, A and B, wish to catch a fly in a joint effort, 
it is very likely that they will occasionally use language to share information about 
that specific fly. Suppose that A wants to refer to the fly and chooses to use the 
definite description ‘the fly’ with that purpose. In this case, A will need to provide 
information that allows B to determine the reference of ‘the fly’ in that context of 
use. If, for some reason, either A or B fails to execute A’s plan of referring properly, 
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and the speaker’s reference cannot be determined, we have an instance of what I 
will call a “nonparadigmatic communicative interaction”2.  
I will be interested here specifically in nonparadigmatic communication 
involving deictic demonstratives, i.e., demonstratives accompanied by ostensive 
acts of demonstration. Moreover, I will focus on the content expressed by such 
terms when interpreters fail to determine reference. My aim is to look for a concept 
of content that explains cognitive significance, namely, how meaning and reference 
are cognized by competent speakers/interpreters of a language3. With that purpose, 
I will compare eavesdroppers to conversational participants.  
I will start with a general characterization of demonstratives and then 
proceed to discuss nonparadigmatic communication. Lastly, I will present Perry’s 
Reflexive-Referential Theory (RRT), claiming that its concept of content accounts 
thoroughly for eavesdropping. According to Perry, utterances of sentences with 
singular terms express several truth-conditional contents, depending on the 
information provided by each corresponding speech situation. For instance, if the 
information content of a situation is enough to allow for the determination of the 
reference of the singular term, the content expressed will be a complete 
proposition or, as Perry names it, the referential content of the utterance. If, 
otherwise, the information content fails to provide such a degree of semantic 
specificity, the content expressed will be bound to the utterance and the data 
provided by its production. Perry calls this last kind of content reflexive, since it is 
about the utterance itself and the linguistic information it carries. In the last section 
of this paper, after my brief presentation of Perry’s multi-content approach, I will 
proceed to show how RRT explains the kind of content apprehended by 
eavesdroppers and its cognitive significance.  
 
1 DEMONSTRATIVE CONTENT  
It is widely accepted by philosophers of language and of linguistics that 
deictic demonstratives, like ‘that’ and ‘this’ in sentences (1), (2) and (3) below, are 
context-dependent expressions that serve the purpose of referring to perceptual 
objects4. 
(1) That is my girlfriend. 
(2) This is my father. 
(3) That table is nice. 
                                       
2 There is more than one way in which communication can be nonparadigmatic, but I will discuss 
only situations in which communication is nonparadigmatic due to failure in determining reference.   
3 I take meaning here to be the linguistic rule that guides the use of an expression, following 
Strawson (1950). The concept of content I will look for is token-reflexive (PERRY, 2001) and 
respects what Wettstein (1985) and Taylor (1995) call the Cognitive Constraint on Semantics.  
4 To be more precise, the referents of demonstratives do not need to be concrete objects. For 
example, we can talk about habits, institutions and feelings with demonstratives and, also, project 
this mode of designation to objects that are not in the situation, such as imaginary things. 
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They are used to perform acts of demonstration and are associated to 
linguistic behavior that involves manipulation of attention with the purpose of 
making individuals perceptually salient to audiences. Karl Buhler (1934), for 
instance, who prolixly discusses deixis in his theory of language, affirms that 
members of the class of demonstrative expressions operate as orientation signs and 
indicators of reference. 
Another way to define demonstratives is in terms of the special property of 
exaphora (Diessel, 1999, 2006); their lexical meanings stipulate that their content 
is to be defined relatively to facts about the utterance, which orient the interpreter 
outside the discourse towards the surrounding situation. Moreover, demonstratives 
have syntactic functions, working, for example, as pronouns — as in (1) and (2) — 
or noun modifiers — as in (3). 
Additionally, demonstratives execute pragmatic functions5, being used to 
focus the hearer’s attention on objects and locations, and on the informational flow 
of the ongoing discourse, as in (4). 
(4) That is exactly what I mean. 
 
Now, the semantic function of deictic demonstratives, according to Diessel, 
is finally to indicate distance relatively to the deictic center (typically the speaker), 
although their meanings carry information about qualities that orient the 
identification of the referent, such as proximity, animacy and humanness. All 
languages6 studied by Diessel had at least two demonstratives marking points on 
a distance scale. Other less frequent deictic features included visibility, height etc. 
Qualitative features, as for example, gender and number are, notwithstanding, 
almost universal. 
In discussing pragmatic features of demonstratives, Diessel highlights the 
important distinction between endophoric and exaphoric uses. Exaphoric uses 
require manipulation of attentional behavior towards the environment, depending 
greatly on extra-linguistic resources. Here, I will use the terminology deictic 
demonstrative to refer to what Diessel calls “exaphoric uses of demonstratives” and 
I shall focus solely on the deictic demonstrative ‘that’, used to refer to visual 
objects7. 
Deictic demonstratives are not only context-dependent, but also context-
variant, given that their semantic sensitivity to situations of use determine that their 
contents consistently vary from one occasion to another. Recanati (2003) succinctly 
summarizes the properties of context-dependence (or sensitivity) and context-
variance of deictic demonstratives in the fragment below:  
                                       
5 The semantic profile that philosophers and linguists often ascribe to demonstratives have to do 
with their pragmatic function.  
6 Diessel (1999) analyzed eighty-five different languages.  
7 For visual perception, speakers manipulate visual attentional behavior towards locations occupied 
by the referents. Semantic theories diverge as to whether or not identifying a visual location is the 
same as identifying the referent. See Kasher (1998) and Grundy (2013). 
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A (disambiguated) expression is context-sensitive or context-
dependent if and only if its semantic content depends upon, and 
varies with, contextual factors such as the speaker’s intention […] 
The semantic content of an expression is that property of it which 
(i) must be grasped by whoever fully understands the expression, 
and (ii) determines the expression's extension. It can be presented 
as a (possibly partial, and possibly constant) function from 
circumstances of evaluation to extensions. The extension of a prima 
facie singular term (name, pronoun, definite description, etc.) is an 
individual object – the reference of the term (RECANATI, 2003, p. 
14). 
 
My proposal is to explore the concept of demonstrative content and discuss 
how it is related to linguistic rules. With that in mind, I explore semantic and 
pragmatic features of demonstratives, following Diessel’s characterization.  
Let us start by taking the example of (5) below. 
(5) Daddy, that is Julie! 
 
Suppose that Jane, a dentist assistant, overhears this utterance, which is part 
of a conversation between a man and his daughter in the waiting room. Jane is 
inside the equipment room and has no visual information regarding the speaker of 
(5), her interlocutor or the putative referent of ‘that’. Call this situation S1. 
In S1, there is no coordination of attentional behavior for many discernable 
reasons: firstly, because the interpreter is not in the same perceptual (visual) 
environment as the speaker; but also, and more importantly, because she is not a 
conversational participant. Jane is what Clark and Shaefer (1992)8 call an 
eavesdropper: a listener (typically a bystander) who overhears the conversation 
but is not acknowledged by the participants. In S1, not only there is no common 
perceptual environment; there is no set of manifestly common assumptions. Father 
and daughter have an indifferent attitude towards Jane as well as towards what she 
can grasp from the utterance. Because Jane is not a part of the collaborative activity 
in course, her informational status is not taken into consideration in designing the 
conversational interaction. 
The problem with conversations like S1 is that eavesdroppers apprehend 
linguistic information, since they are competent speakers/interpreters of a natural 
language, but they are not in position to take part in the specific plans of 
communication of which the utterances that they interpret are part. In the case of 
Jane, she has the necessary skills to interpret the utterance of (5) truth-
conditionally, but she does not participate in the plan of referring to Julie. 
In the remaining of this section, I will develop the claim that Jane, though 
external to the conversational setting, accesses truth-conditional content. 
Additionally, I compare semantic interpretation in paradigmatic situations in which 
the determination of reference is collaborative with the case of eavesdropping. 
                                       
8 Whose categorization is inspired by Goffman (1981).  
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1.1 CONTEXT AS CONVERSATIONAL COMMON GROUND 
The term ‘context’ is often understood in a vague sense, as the setting in 
which communicative acts take place; in this sense, it has no additional technical 
connotation. Context as a representation of concrete speech situations for 
theoretical purposes was famously systematized by David Kaplan (1989). Kaplan 
thought that contexts were necessary for his project of developing a logic of 
demonstratives, but in the end, his theory was mostly focused on the special 
semantic nature of other context-dependent expressions, namely, pure indexicals 
(‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’). Contexts are then considered necessary, for Kaplan, to explain 
what he calls indexical nature of context-dependent expressions. 
Kaplan’s choice of introducing contexts is, firstly, based on the idea that the 
semantics of indexicals should be accounted for by a bi-dimensional semantics in 
which contexts determine content (or the proposition expressed/what is said)9, 
while truth-values are determined by the circumstances in which contents are 
evaluated (actual and contrafactual). Secondly, it is motivated by his 
acknowledgment that contents can be represented as intensions. So, content can 
be shifted by intensional operators for time and possible world, as, for example, 
‘in ten years’, ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’. What I will identify here as the Kaplanian 
context is also defined as narrow context, and it corresponds to the set of 
semantically relevant parameters for the determination of content, which include 
the agent, the time-space location and a possible world. 
Narrow context is defined in contrast with broad (or wide) context, which, 
on its own turn, includes all information that is communicationally relevant to the 
successful completion of a speech act, including what the speaker means10. It is 
then standardly assumed that broad context differs from narrow context in that it 
is recruited only once the proposition expressed is determined. While narrow 
context is used semantically, broad context is used either post-semantically — once 
the proposition is determined — or pre-semantically — before the proposition is 
determined, to fix linguistic features. 
According to Recanati (2003), philosophical literature about contextual 
dependence is populated with different approaches to the problem of how to 
represent broad context. Would its role really be limited to the pre-propositional 
as well as to the post-propositional stage of interpretation? If the answer is ‘yes’, 
we are left with the problem of explaining the interpretation of statements with 
demonstratives and some indexicals, as Recanati remarks:   
 
We pretend to be able to manage the situation with a narrow notion 
of context, the kind we choose to deal with indexicals, when, in 
fact, we can only determine the referent intended by the speaker 
(i.e. the narrow context relevant to the Interpretation of 
                                       
9 For demonstratives, the Kaplanian semantics includes a) a character, the demonstrative’s 
conventional meaning; b) the content (the character-in-context); and c) a directing intention 
manifested by a demonstration. The demonstration externalizes an inner intention to refer to a 
perceptual object on which the speaker has focused his attention.  
10 See Grice (1969, 1986). 
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enunciation) when we turn to pragmatic interpretation, relying on 
the broad context. (RECANATI, 2003, p.5)   
 
Here, Recanati reinforces the idea that the requirement of automatism in the 
attribution of occasional value to sensitive expressions, that is, of "purity" of the 
context/meaning relation is satisfied only by a very limited number of expressions. 
As he points out, even the egocentric categories 'here' and 'now' — also 'today' — 
are amenable to interpretation in terms of broad context11. To summarize, the 
dispute here is between those in favor of expanding the phenomenon of context-
sensitivity — moderately or radically — and those more firmly committed to minimal 
semantics12. 
Among the contemporary philosophers who favor the alternative of 
representing context in terms of broad context, abdicating this exclusive concern 
with sensitive expressions, is Stalnaker (1999, 2002), with his conception of 
discursive context. In his view, context is not simply a theoretical construct that 
explains the strict phenomenon of indexicality; it is rather the implicit or 
presupposed "body of information that is deemed, at a certain point, as common 
to the participants in the discourse" (STALNAKER, 1999, p. 98). Performance of 
new assertions, for Stalnaker, correspond to requests to update what is being taken 
for granted at a moment t. Each new assertion must satisfy certain conditions: a) 
its content cannot be contrary or contradictory with respect to the propositions 
taken as true at that moment; and b) such propositions should be taken for granted 
by all participants. Context, for Stalnaker, is then the dynamic presupposed 
common ground of a conversational exchange. 
Now, let us return to (5) and the case of eavesdropping. It seems evident 
that Jane, the father and the daughter do not share a presupposed common ground 
of assumptions. The propositional commitments that father and daughter 
undertake are not manifest to Jane, and her informational status is completely 
ignored by them. As a result, the daughter, call her Lily, will not worry about 
adjusting her plan of referring to Julie to what Jane knows before the utterance of 
(5), nor will she be concerned with what Jane will come to know afterwards. 
If Jane were acknowledged by Lily, the girl’s plan of referring would 
probably not involve a demonstration. Compare S1 to S2. Imagine that Lily knows 
Jane now, and that they are talking over the phone. Lily wants to tell Jane that she 
has a new friend, whose name is Julie.  In this situation, she might utter something 
like (6): 
                                       
11For a more detailed idea of the distinction between narrow and broad context, see Corazza 
(2014). 
12 Following Corazza (2014) and his characterization of Minimalism, I understand by minimal 
semantics the thesis that context is necessary for the determination of the proposition expressed by 
an utterance if selected by morphemes of the sentence. According to minimalist semantics, the role 
of semantics is to determine the truth-conditions of well-formed sentences of a natural language in 
accordance with the principle of compositionality. Furthermore, in this view, pragmatics is kept out 
of truth-conditional interpretation. Unlike semantic interpretation, pragmatic interpretation is 
inferential, intentional and non-conventional. 
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(6) Jane, do you remember Nick’s sister? She is my new schoolmate. Her name 
is Julie. 
 
Here, Lily takes Jane’s informational status into consideration and chooses 
an appropriate cognitive path that will lead her interlocutor to the referent13. 
Though fallible, her plan explores a common ground of assumptions that includes 
the information that Julie has a brother named Nick, who Jane is familiar with. In 
S2, Lily’s act of referring is, in contrast to S1, sucessful. Success, in this case, is 
measured by the level of collaboration (in what regards information sharing) 
between conversational participants. I will say a few words about that in the next 
sub-section. 
 
1.1.1 CONVERSATION AND COLLABORATION 
As Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) point out, in conversations, reference is 
established in collaboration, at least paradigmatically. The aboutness of an 
utterance typically becomes part of the common ground by means of coordinated 
behavior (acceptance, rejection, etc.) and by the systems of repair and 
reinforcement that permit communicational improvement whenever it is necessary:  
People in conversation manage who is to talk at which times 
through an intricate system of turn taking […]. Further, when one 
person speaks, the others not only listen but let the speaker know 
they are understanding-with head nods, yes’s, uh huh’s, and other 
so-called back channel responses (Duncan, 1973; Goodwin, 1981). 
When listeners don’t understand, or when other troubles arise, they 
can interrupt for correction or clarification […]. The participants also 
have techniques for initiating, guiding, and terminating 
conversations and the topics within them […] (CLARK & WILKES-
GIBBS, 1986, p. 2).   
 
Luckily for speakers, linguistic communication is the fluid, self-preserving 
process described above. We have mechanisms to accommodate or exclude non-
collaborative conversational contributions and recuperate the rational character of 
paradigmatic communication. Their idea is that all participants are mutually 
responsible for establishing what was said, mostly because they rely on shared 
information all the time, and they make assumptions about each other’s statuses. 
Also, speakers need the repair mechanisms because accomplishing plans of 
referring depends greatly on how well the interlocutor is following every step, 
grasping every piece of information delivered by the speaker. 
In our example of S1, Jane is not acknowledged by the other participants. 
So, there can be no division of labor in establishing what was said. Additionally, 
Jane, an eavesdropper, cannot take part in repair mechanisms in a pragmatically 
                                       
13 The contrast here — in the cases of (5) and (6) — is between a demonstrative and a rich description 
of the referent. The idea is to compare two modes of designation: demonstrating and describing.  
Eduarda Calado Barbosa       61 
SOFIA (ISSN 2317-2339), VITÓRIA (ES), V.8, N.1, P. 54-66, JAN./JUN. 2019 
appropriate way. Eavesdroppers are excluded from what Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs call 
acceptance cycles.  
The basic process, which might be called the acceptance cycle, 
consists of a presentation plus its verdict. Let x, y, and z stand for 
noun phrases or their emendations. A presents x and then B 
evaluates it. If the verdict is not positive, then A or B must refashion 
that presentation. That person can offer: a repair x’, an expansion 
y, or a replacement z. The refashioned presentation, whether x’, x 
+ y, or z, is evaluated, and so on. Acceptance cycles apply 
iteratively, with one repair, expansion, or replacement after 
another, until a noun phrase is mutually accepted. With that, A and 
B take the process to be complete (CLARK & WILKES-GIBBS, 1986, 
p. 24). 
 
A request of repair from Jane’s part, in trying to determine the referent of 
‘that’ in (5), would doubtlessly be taken as an inadequate behavior. All information 
Jane will be able to gather from the utterance will have to respect her status of 
non-participant in the conversation. So, in S1, she will fail to apprehend the content 
that Lily intended to express to her father. But, what content does she apprehend, 
as a competent speaker of English? 
Lily and her father in S1 are exchanging information about the individual 
Julie. If Lily’s plan of referring succeeds, he will be able to identify the 
demonstratum of ‘that’, with the help of some ostensive act that makes Julie salient. 
The conventional meaning of ‘that’ will accomplish its task in indicating which 
individual in the perceptual environment it denotes, if and only if it offers the 
adequate conditions of identification in that context of use. In a paradigmatic 
situation, Lily’s father will apprehend the following truth-conditions, where the 
boldface marks the contribution made by the demonstrative to the proposition 
expressed: 
(P5) Julie is named ‘Julie’.  
 
However, (P5) is not what Jane apprehends. Because she has scarce 
information in S1, all she has at her disposal are the conventional meanings of the 
expressions used by Lily in uttering (5), and the little she knows about the 
production of that token. Thus, it seems that Jane accesses something like (Pr5), 
where the italics mark the conditions of identification carried by the conventional 
meaning of ‘that’: 
(Pr5) That the individual made salient by the speaker of (5), standing at 
distance d relatively to the speaker, is named ‘Julie’. 
 
Now, compare S1 with a new situation, S3. In S3, Jane sees the speaker, the 
interlocutor and the other girl, who is the referent of ‘that’. In this communicative 
situation, Jane accesses (P5). She identifies the individual which the utterance of 
(5) is about and the conditions in which that utterance is true. In contrasting S3 
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and S1, we see that in the new situation, Jane, though still a bystander, whose 
informational status is not a part of the common ground, can successfully identify 
the aboutness of the token. More, though absent from the speaker’s communicative 
plan, Jane is now in the same perceptual environment as the speaker, and she can 
adjust her attention according to the speaker’s indications, even if she is not asked 
to do so. 
(Pr5) is called by John Perry (2001) the reflexive truth-conditions (of (5)). 
Perry defines it as not being about the referent of the singular term in the sentence, 
but about the utterance itself. According to his theory, content is a resource used 
by rational agents to classify states of affairs in terms of conditions of success, so 
truth-conditional content is what explains, among other things, the adequacy of 
beliefs to evidence. I will now explain Perry’s notion of content and return once 
again to the analysis of (5), before I advance a few observations on demonstrative 
content. 
 
2 PERRY’S CONCEPT OF CONTENT 
Consider the example, in Perry (2001), of a man who sees the daily 
newspaper on his balcony one morning and acquires the belief that the newspaper 
is on the balcony. The content of the belief classifies the state of affairs, given some 
facts about the world and the information that is perceptually accessible to the 
agent. A neighbor who observes the situation and sees the man pick the newspaper 
from the floor is justified in assigning to him the belief that the newspaper is on 
the floor and, furthermore, to suppose that his action can be explained by the 
possession of such a belief. 
In Perry, content is also goal-oriented. Take a variant of his original 
example. Suppose that the man picking the newspaper from his balcony floor that 
morning is named John, and he is an old acquaintance of Louie, the newspaper 
delivery man. John just found out that his and Louie’s old friend, Joe, passed away, 
and he wishes to tell Louie the sad news. John has expectations about such 
conversation, but when he goes out to the balcony with the purpose of waiting for 
Louie, he sees that the newspaper was already delivered. What beliefs can we 
attribute to John? We can reliably say that John believes that the newspaper is on 
the floor. Nonetheless, given our narrative and John’s goals, expectations and what 
is perceived by him, it is also reasonable to suppose that John has the belief that 
Louie has already delivered his newspaper that morning. Notice that the content 
of John’s belief depends on what John’s classificatory targets are. That is why Perry 
argues that the classificatory concept of content strongly depends on the 
information content available in the situation that the agent classifies.  
Perry holds that his concept of content is particularly advantageous for an 
adequate theory of language because it accounts for how human language is used 
to communicate cognitive states, given that such states ultimately influence the way 
we act. As a matter of fact, the central claim in Perry (2001) is that there is a system 
Eduarda Calado Barbosa       63 
SOFIA (ISSN 2317-2339), VITÓRIA (ES), V.8, N.1, P. 54-66, JAN./JUN. 2019 
of truth-conditional contents at the theorist’s disposal to explain how linguistic and 
information content are adjusted to one another. He points out that: 
[…] the concept of ‘truth-conditions of an utterance’ is a relative 
concept, although it is often treated as if it were absolute. Instead 
of thinking in terms of the truth-conditions of an utterance, we 
should think of the truth-conditions of an utterance given various 
facts about it. And when we do this we are led to see that talking 
about the content of an utterance is an oversimplification (PERRY, 
2001, p. 80). 
  
Consequently, he heavily criticizes what he calls the principle of the unique 
content. Perry claims that more than one semantic content is generated by 
utterances of declarative sentences (with referential expressions). One of them is 
the proposition expressed14: one that involves a n-ary relation between a property 
and n individual(s), <Ix; e >, which must, in some way, relate to the conditions 
that make the utterance true. But, still, why should the proposition be considered 
a kind of content or, better still, why has it been equated with the concept of 
content by an important tradition in the philosophy of language?15.  
According to Perry, the main reason why the proposition is equated with 
the notion of content is its situational specificity and the fact that it is what typical 
agents say in typical communicative interactions. Propositions represent a high 
level of semantic specificity, because an interpreter only apprehends it once she 
loads all the spatial-temporal and intentional aspects that are relevant to semantic 
interpretation into truth-conditions, leaving no room for ambiguity or unfilled 
semantic slots. It is supposed to be the result of semantic interpretation, the content 
that the speaker wished to convey by performing her speech act in the first place. 
But, as he insists, the proposition is not the only content that is conveyed. It is 
given, partially, by the conventionally meaningful parts of the sentence, but more 
fundamentally, by the relation that the language associates with sentences, 
contextual factors and circumstances. He affirms: “The truth-conditions of an 
utterance derive directly from the meaning assigned to the sentence involved, 
whereas which proposition is expressed depends also on the agent, time and 
circumstances of utterance”. (PERRY, 1997, p. 197). Perry, however, takes 
nonparadigmatic communicative situations as explananda. It is because his 
approach on content is, in a sense, instrumentalist at heart, allowing for multiple 
possibilities of interpretation, that he can account for such situations.  
According to the Perryan framework, the system of contents expressed by 
the utterance of (5), then, will include (Pr5) and (P5). In S1, however, Jane, being 
an eavesdropper, will apprehend (Pr5), truth-conditions that are about the 
conventionally meaningful parts of (5) — as well as about the production of the 
utterance itself —, and not (P5). That will be the case because the content expressed 
by (5) in S1 is relative to the information content of the situation. But one important 
                                       
14 Though he is not exactly concerned with the ontology of propositions, he takes the classic 
characterization of propositions as sharable objects of belief, the semantic content to which we 
attribute truth-values. 
15 Of which Kaplan is an example.  
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thing is still left to be explained: what is the role of reflexive truth-conditions like 
(Pr5) in explaining interpretation? Can we affirm that conventional meaning has a 
cognitively significant role in cases such our example or does demonstrative 
meaning “drops out of the picture” (NUNBERG, 1993) to give room to content? 
To answer this question, let us recap some of our previous conclusions 
about the case of S1. Firstly, S1 was characterized as the setting of a 
nonparadigmatic communicative interaction in which the interpreter of the 
utterance of (5) is an eavesdropper, that is, an overhearer who is not acknowledge 
by conversational participants. I defined participants according to a common 
ground notion of context, based on Stalnaker’s seminal ideas about the 
representation of context. Next, I completed this definition with some observations 
about how participants contribute to conversations, using Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 
idea of cycles of acceptance. Then, I set to look for a concept of content that could 
explain what eavesdroppers apprehend as interpreters of a natural language. 
Lastly, I outlined Perry’s concept of classificatory content and his critique to 
the principle of unique content. According to him, one utterance expresses virtually 
several contents, depending on the information carried by the speech situation. In 
this view, then, an utterance of (5) in S1 expresses a content that is about linguistic 
information: about the utterance and its production. We seem thus to have found 
an answer to one of our first questions: what content does an eavesdropper 
apprehend? 
Following Perry, I suggested that such content corresponded to the reflexive 
truth-conditions of (5), namely (Pr5). In effect, what seems to be at issue in the 
case of S1 is to provide a distinction between the content apprehended by a 
conversational participant and the content apprehended by a sheer interpreter. In 
Jane’s case specifically, because the demonstrative in (5) is a context-dependent 
expression that requires either that the speaker and the interpreter are in the same 
perceptual environment, or that they collaborate in the same plan of referring, the 
information content of S1 is too scarce to allow for the determination of reference. 
Perry’s reflexive truth-conditions come in handy precisely to explain interpretation 
situations such as S1. 
Nonetheless, reflexive content is about the token of a sentence and the 
linguistic conventions it incorporates. In the case of a deictic demonstrative, it is 
about the conditions of identification that work as individuating properties 
relatively to contexts. These conditions have the form of a linguistic rule, but they 
also depend on the speaker’s ability to make the putative referent salient to her 
audience. Both aspects have an indicative function, in the sense that they serve as 
pointers to individuals, given their spatial locations. The linguistic rule, however, 
underspecifies truth-conditions, because it does not provide a property that 
uniquely identifies the referent, as content is, prima facie, supposed to. After all, 
the reference of ‘that’ will always depend greatly on intentional elements, and the 
demonstrative’s meaning seems to “drop out of the picture” once content is 
determined. 
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My second question concerns this view on the dichotomy between 
demonstrative meaning and demonstrative content in what concerns cognitve 
significance. It seems certainly correct that meaning alone, in the case of a context-
dependent and context-variant expression, such as a deictic demonstrative, 
underspecifies reference. Recanati (2004) presents some convincing arguments to 
this effect. Yet, not all cognitively significant tasks in the interpretation of a deictic 
demonstrative have to be executed by the final content, that is, the proposition. In 
determining how one says something in using the word ‘that’, conventional 
meaning leaves an informational trace that can be used by competent interpreters 
in reconstructing what was conveyed by the speaker in a given situation. 
Remember that, in S1, the reflexive linguistic rules involved in the utterance 
of (5) were the only sources of information at Jane’s disposal in adjusting her belief-
states to what she overhears. In the event of being asked about what was said by 
(5), Jane would probably recruit her classificatory practices to generate content like 
(Pr5). Our example seems to show, then, that, when communication is somehow 
defective, information about the utterance may come to the rescue of 
informativeness in communication, allowing for the rational reconstruction of 
(linguistic) behavior. 
Furthermore, classificatory practices play exactly this role: permitting that 
agents harness information following requirements of success and rationality, even 
in situations with informational scarcity in what concerns the determination of 
reference. The classificatory concept of content helps us explain these very 
mundane situations of information harnessing. In accepting this claim, we should 
keep in mind that, whenever the informational game of language is ineffectual, 
defective, abnormal, whatever allows speakers to play the game, will do the trick 
of taking on the role of content. 
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